GistReel

Peter Magyar, a former fervent supporter of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has brought an end to his mentor’s 16-year rule when his Tisza party scored a resounding victory in Sunday’s parliamentary election.

With votes counted in 97.35 percent of precincts early Monday, Magyar’s centre-right party has 138 seats in the 199-seat parliament and 53.6 percent of the vote. Official results show Orban’s Christian nationalist Fidesz party winning 55 seats with 37.8 percent of the vote.

On Sunday, 45-year-old Magyar delivered a victory speech to tens of thousands of supporters gathered along the Danube River in Budapest, saying, “Tonight, truth prevailed over lies.”

“We won today because Hungarians asked not what their homeland could do for them, but what they could do for their motherland. You’ve found the answer. “And you followed through.”

But, who is Magyar? And how does his win affect Hungary and the rest of the world?

Who is Magyar, previously a fervent Orbán supporter?

Peter Magyar, whose surname literally means “Hungarian,” was born in Budapest in March 1981 to a family of lawyers. He is also the great-nephew of Ferenc Madl, Hungary’s president from 2000 to 2005, a period that overlapped with part of Orban’s first stint as prime minister (1998–2002).

In 2004, he graduated from Pázmány Péter Catholic University near Budapest with a law degree and began his career in corporate law. At university, he joined Orban’s Fidesz, which was then in opposition after failing to secure a majority in the 2002 election despite winning the majority of seats.

In an interview with the Hungarian podcast Fokuszcsoport last October, Magyar stated that as a young boy, he was impressed by Orban and his views because of how he led Hungary’s pro-democracy marches against the Soviet Union and the Moscow-backed communist regime in Budapest.

Many sources describe the current leader of the Tisza party as a sharp-tongued man who did not respect authority and was very independent and ambitious.

Magyar’s family belonged to the post-communist, Christian-democratic elite, with distant family ties to lawyers such as Ferenc Mádl, Hungary’s president from 2000 to 2005.

This upbringing moulded Magyar’s ambitions for a public role, and he eventually joined Fidesz under Orbán’s leadership. He maintained tight ties with key members in the Orbán camp, including Gergely Gulyás, who presently heads the prime minister’s office.

In 2006, they staged protests against the left-liberal administration while Magyar provided legal representation to victims of police assault.

He and Gulyás became friends during their college years in Hamburg, Germany, and it was at one of Gulyás’ parties that Magyar met his future wife.

The couple, who were raising three sons, separated in March 2023, with Magyar citing political differences as a contributing factor.

Varga, on the other hand, said that he physically and verbally abused her, including shutting her in a room on one occasion. Magyar denounced her statements as “propaganda” perpetrated by those close to Orbán. The court has not yet ruled on the case.

The pardon scandal

The problems with his wife, who was the minister of justice at the time, grew worse. In January 2023, two months before their divorce, Magyar covertly taped one of their talks in which Varga discussed how government authorities interfered in a corruption investigation.

It involved a state secretary from her ministry accepting bribes to influence the selection of court bailiffs. The state secretary was notified of the ongoing inquiry, and Antal Rogán, the minister in charge of secret services and government communications, could be removed from the case files.

Magyar later explained his actions by claiming he needed an insurance policy in case he ran into trouble with Orbán’s leadership.

For over a year, nothing transpired until February 2024, when President Katalin Novák and Judit Varga were both forced to resign due to the pardon scandal.

The immediate reason was that Novák, with the countersignature of then-Minister of Justice Varga, pardoned a convicted official who had intervened in the interests of a paedophile.

Varga had earlier resigned from her ministerial position in order to focus on the European Parliament campaign as leader of Fidesz’s electoral list; but, due to the scandal, she also resigned from that position.

Magyar arrived on the scene at that very moment. He started attacking the administration on Facebook and was eventually granted a platform as a guest on the independent channel Partizán.

His legitimacy was based on the fact that he was a Fidesz insider with knowledge of corruption processes. He was thus the first member of Orbán’s camp to criticise the administration from inside, and he quickly spoke to tens of thousands of dissatisfied people amid high inflation and a cost-of-living problem.

That year, on the national holiday of March 15, more people (about 50,000) attended Magyar’s rally than the central remembrance arranged by Orbán supporters. Magyar was already talking about forming a new party and administration, indicating that he planned to run in the elections.

The Birth of Tisza

The number of public events then increased; following a demonstration at the end of March, they arranged a so-called National March on April 6, 2024, with an unprecedented turnout of more than 100,000 people.

At the same time, a group of businesses and public leaders started forming the new party. Magyar declared that he was embarking on a tour of the country with his team, intending to visit every municipality before the European Parliament elections in June 2024.

The nascent movement needed to affiliate with an established political party to compete in the upcoming European Parliament elections.

They finally founded the Tisza party, which was registered in 2020 (its full name is the Party of Respect and Freedom – Tisztelet és Szabadság Pártja), and issued a public call for candidates for the European elections.

Tisza was still mainly a one-man show at the time, with Magyar serving as the center of its communications and management.

They had only three months until the elections, and despite the lack of a national organisational framework, the party earned 29.6 percent of the vote, drawing 1.3 million individuals.

It obtained seven of the 21 possible mandates and joined the centre-right European People’s Party group in the European Parliament, which Orbán’s supporters had previously left.

Magyar joined the party’s seven MEPs. Although Fidesz retained almost 45 percent, it was clear that Tisza would be the principal rival to the governing party in the legislative elections.

Tizsa becomes a nationwide party.

The party was initially cobbled together ‘on the fly’, with theatrical director Márk Radnai devising the media strategy, actor and influencer Ervin Nagy mobilising the populace, and Magyar overseeing everything. They also built a fundraising network, an IT system for connecting with supporters, and recruited thousands of volunteers.

However, following the European Parliament elections, Tisza also professionalised in this field. They created a communal network known as ‘Tisza Szigetek’ (Tisza Islands) that covered the entire country.

Meanwhile, Magyar upped his campaign activities. In addition to actively using social media, he worked to undermine the influence of pro-government media and Fidesz by travelling across the country, which he effectively continued until the legislative elections.

Symbolic gestures, such as walking 250 kilometres from Budapest to the Romanian city of Oradea in May 2025 to gain the support of Hungarian minorities residing in surrounding countries, who had primarily voted for Fidesz, fall into this context as well.

During the legislative election campaign, Magyar visited 500 venues, including up to seven municipalities in a single day – an unprecedented pace in Hungarian politics.

Despite this, Magyar’s image is not clear in the eyes of Tisza followers. Along with many ardent supporters, many others regarded him as a means to end Fidesz’s dominance and voted for him for pragmatic reasons.

Businessman Dezső Farkas, who was present during Tisza’s founding, abandoned the party after the European Parliament elections. He stated to Politico that the party’s early’start-up’ enthusiasm had been replaced by an internal power struggle.

He eventually returned for a brief period before leaving again, citing the party’s internal life as becoming increasingly “toxic” and reminiscent of the Fidesz regime, under which Magyar had previously served. It is system-based on loyalty rather than performance.

Magyar has been the party’s undisputed leader since its inception. Only he is permitted to give media interviews, and appearances by other party figures are permitted only on rare occasions and under carefully regulated conditions, as the Napunk newsroom discovered in its daily operations. Tisza’s communication with the media is further hindered by Magyar’s attacks on independent sources.

The reality is that Magyar has demonstrated resilience in the face of discrediting campaigns and is well-versed in knowing when and when not to come out during such procedures.

In his benefit is the fact that over the last two years, he has managed to surround himself with reputable specialists (such as former Shell vice-president István Kapitány and Anita Orbán, former Vodafone deputy CEO), who may become major players in the party’s future.

What can be expected from a Tisza government?

In an interview with the weekly HVG, Magyar stated that a change of government would be a huge relief for individuals who had never experienced true democracy. One of his promises is to re-establish the operation of a democratic, rule-of-law state.

The Tisza party leader stated that they will not distribute political posts until the extent of the voters’ mandate is known; however, he did reveal that they will abolish the current ministry structure, which includes no separate ministries of health, education, or the environment.

“The Office for the Protection of the Constitution [Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal] would most likely be put under the interior ministry, which would once again become a clean slate devoid of education and health.

Meanwhile, the intelligence service [Információs Hivatal] would most likely be transferred to the foreign ministry,” Magyar stated of his plans for the secret services.

If a Tisza government is created, there will be no tolerance for corruption, according to Magyar. They will apply to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and establish a National Office for Asset Recovery and Protection.

They will order asset checks dating back 20 years for all MPs, ministers, and the prime minister. They will also share transcripts of government meetings held after 2010—those that do not harm Hungary’s economic and security interests.

One of Magyar and his team’s frequently repeated and startling promises is that they will cease news programs from propagandistic public-service media until the public media is transformed. They’re prepared to pass a new media law.

If they win power, the Tisza leader has highlighted the most pressing issues as the implementation of anti-corruption measures, the release of frozen EU funding, and the passage of a new state budget.

Subsequent actions will include imposing a wealth tax on billionaires and halting huge investment projects that were deemed a waste of public funds.

The next health minister must lower waiting times within a year and a half. In education, they intend to implement a new national curriculum.

Following an electoral victory, they would remove political appointees from their positions, including the prosecutor-general and president of the republic. They already have the legal tools in place, but Magyar believes other approaches are also viable.

Another key commitment is to limit the prime minister’s term to eight years and incorporate it in the constitution. Interestingly, this provision would apply retrospectively to Orbán, who would no longer be eligible to vie for the position.

A change of course can also be envisaged in foreign policy, as follows from Tisza’s program: they would reinstate the system of international relations with historic allies, such as the Visegrád countries, the European Union, and NATO.

At the same time, they would halt the process of gradually removing Hungary from the EU. Hungary’s role in the EU would thus shift, resulting in fewer tensions between Budapest and Brussels.

The new Hungarian government would approach relations with Moscow in a more measured, realistic manner.

Magyar has recently taken a strong stance towards Slovakia, citing a revision to the law regarding the Beneš decrees, which expropriated the Hungarian minority.

The Tisza leader participated in a January demonstration in Budapest against the law, promising that if Bratislava did not change its position, a Tisza administration would expel the Slovak ambassador from Hungary.

What will Magyar’s policy positions be?

Magyar has pledged to revitalise Hungary’s economy, which has been sluggish since early 2022.

He also promised to improve relations with the EU. Because of Orban’s tight links with Russia, relations between Brussels and Budapest deteriorated. Magyar stated that he intends to reduce Hungary’s reliance on Russian energy by 2035, while pursuing “pragmatic relations” with Moscow.

He also stated that he would work on convincing the EU to release monies that had been frozen due to Hungary’s claimed inability to meet a number of the bloc’s financial support terms.

At the same time, Magyar has previously been sceptical of Ukraine’s ambition to join the EU soon, suggesting that the process should not be rushed, putting him at odds with Kyiv.

Vegh stated that it is unclear what type of leader Magyar will be, but that he is attempting to distinguish himself by emphasising his duty as a service to the public and the nation.